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Detrimental Reliance On A Promise
(Promissory Estoppel) In Oklahoma
By Martin A. Frey And Joann E. Long
The landscape of the law of contracts is rapidly
changing due to the pressures of the doctrine of
detrimental reliance. Outdated is the notion that
contract formation requires offer, acceptance, and
consideration. No longer is an offer irrevocable at
the whim of the offeror nor are statements made
during preliminary negotiations unenforceable.
And the mandate of statutes, such as the Statute of
Frauds, has been dramatically eroded.
Historically the source of detrimental reliance in
the field of contract law is equitable estoppel-a
representation of fact made by one party and relied
on by the other. The representing party was
precluded (estopped) from alleging or proving a
fact that would contradict the truth of his or her
earlier representation if the other party had taken
action in reliance on that representation of fact.
Equitable estoppel eventually expanded to include
estoppel by silence as well as estoppel by conduct.I
The elements of equitable estoppel in Oklahoma
became:
(1) a false representation or concealment of
facts (the representation or concealment may
arise from silence of 'a party under an im-
perative duty to speak);
(2) it must have been made with knowledge,
actual or constructive, of the real facts;
(3) the party to whom it was made must have
been without knowledge, or the means of
knowledge, of the real facts;
(4) it must have been made with the intention
that it should be acted upon (the intention that
the representation or concealment be acted
upon may be inferred from the circumstances);
and
(5) the party to whom it was made must have
relied on or acted upon it to his or her pre-
judice.
Underpinning the doctrine of equitable estoppel is
the equitable principle that a party cannot stand by
in violation of his or her duty in equity and good
conscience to warn another party of the real facts,
and permit the other to take some detrimental'ac-
tion before asserting the real facts.3
During the late 1800s, cases began to appear
recognizing detrimental reliance as a basis for the
enforcement of a promise as well as a representa-
tion of fact. Prior to that time a promise without
consideration was gratuitous and enforceable only
if it was executed. This doctrine of detrimental
reliance on a promise, called promissory estoppel,4
was derived from the same equitable principles as
was the earlier equitable estoppel.' In equitable
estoppel, the injured party detrimentally relies on
the represented facts while in promissory estoppel
the injured party detrimentally relies on the
gratuitous promise.,
The early cases recognizing reliance as a basis for
the enforcement of a promise were classifiable into
four categories: (1) family gift promises (one family
member relied on a gift promise made by another
family member);7 (2) oral gift promises to convey
land (the promisee relied on the promisor's promise
by moving onto the land and making im-
provements);8 (3) promises coupled with gratuitous
bailments (the bailor relied on a promise by the
bailee in connection with a gratuitous bailment);9
and (4) charitable subscriptions (a charitable in-
stitution relied on a promised gift or donation).o
The elements of promissory estoppel in Oklahoma
are:
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(1) a promise by the promisor;
(2) the promisor intended that the promisee act
upon the promise;
(3) the promisee did act upon the promise
without protest or warning from the promisor,
resulting in a material detriment to the prom-
isee."
By its very name, the concept of promissory
estoppel precludes the promisor from asserting that
his or her promise is not binding due to lack of con-
sideration. This results in contract formation with
consideration. Preclusion, an approach followed
by the older promissory estoppel cases, explains the
historically narrow application of promissory
estoppel. Courts began with the assumption that
without consideration contract formation could not
take place. By barring a party from asserting the
lack of consideration, a court could find that con-
sideration was present, a contract formed, and the
promise binding.12
From the preclusion approach of promissory
estoppel, the relianie doctrine was changed
dramatically by the Restatement's technique of
positively asserting the promisor's liability. The
Restatement of Contracts (1932) avoids the phrase
"promissory estoppel," using instead a "promise
reasonably inducing action or forbearance," which
can be shortened to "detrimental reliance."13 Under
the Restatement the promisor's promise is binding
upon any substantial act or reliance by the other
party."
With this concept of reliance, no bar to assertion
of truth by the promisor is necessary. Instead, the
promise affirmatively binds the promisor as a
promise without consideration. The Restatement
(Second) of Contracts makes clear that the prom-
isor's promise is binding but only to the extent that
"justice requires." The Restatement (Second) of
Contracts §90, entitled "Promise Reasonably In-
ducing Action or Forbearance," provides:
(1) A promise which the promisor should
reasonably expect to induce action or
forbearance on the part of the promisee or a
third person and which does induce such action
or forbearance is binding if injustice can be
avoided only by enforcement of the promise.
The remedy granted for breach may be limited
as justice requires.'15
But even with the Restatement's dispensing with
the fiction of promissory estoppel (and the concep-
tual importance of the shift from preclusion to a
bold enforcement of the promise), courts often ap-
ply Restatement §90 and label it promissory estop-
pel.'6
The trend of detrimental reliance (promissory
estoppel) cases is not to restrict the doctrine to those
classes of cases from which the doctrine originated.
Rather the doctrine has expanded to include the en-
forcement of any promise which meets the re-
quirements of the Restatement §90. This article will
focus on the trend of the detrimental reliance cases




When a promise is bargained-for, courts have
been reluctant to invoke reliance. The promisee
should accept the promisor's offer rather than
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merely rely upon it. The doctrine of detrimental
reliance will, however, apply to a promise made
without consideration, that is a gift promise."
Courts no longer limit detrimental reliance to the
four types of gift promises where the doctrine had
its inception (family gift promises, oral gift prom-
ises to convey land, promises coupled with
gratuitous bailments, and charitable subscriptions).
For example, courts have bound parties promis-
ing to pay retirement benefits," to preserve an
unobstructed view of the scenic countryside," to
pay a gratuitous note given solely to strengthen the
bank's assets for bank examination purposes,2 0 and
to release any further obligation under a lease.21 A
leading text writer has even said, "The kinds of
promises which are likely to induce reliance may be
applied are as varied as human ingenuity."2 1
Oklahoma's treatment of detrimental reliance in
gift promise cases is affected by three statutes.
Originally enacted in 1910, Oklahoma Statute title
15, section 107, enforces gift promises based on
moral obligation without the necessity of discussing
detrimental reliance to circumvent the lack of con-
sideration. Traditionally moral obligation could
not be consideration for a promise. Section 107
provides the opposite:
[A] moral obligation originating in some
benefit conferred upon the promisor, or pre-
judice suffered by the promisee, is also a good
consideration for a promise, to an extent cor-
responding with the extent of the obligation,
but no further or otherwise.13
With moral obligation as consideration, the prom-
ise is enforceable without the detrimental reliance
doctrine.
For those gift promise cases where the promise
was not based on a moral obligation, Oklahoma
Statute title 15, section 114 (also dating back to
1910), comes into play. It provides:
A written instrument is presumptive
evidence of a consideration.24
This section is implemented by section 115 which
allocates the burden of proof as to consideration:
The burden of showing a want of considera-
tion sufficient to support an instrument lies
with the party seeking to invalidate or avoid
it.2"
Thus for those written gift promises not based on
moral obligation, the burden of proof as to con-
sideration is shifted to the party contending a lack
of consideration.
The Oklahoma courts' treatment of detrimental
reliance in gift promise cases (gift promises not bas-
ed on moral obligation) has been extremely
cautious, even in the four traditional classes of
cases where the doctrine had its beginning. We
were hard pressed to find a family gift promise case
(where one family member relied on a gift promise
made by another family member.) 26 The oral gift
promise to convey land (where the promisee relies
on the promisor's promise by moving onto the land
and making improvements) has been handled under
a part performance doctrine rather than under
detrimental reliance.27
In a promise coupled with gratuitous bailment
case (where the bailor relied on the promise by the
bailee in connection with a gratuitous bailment),
the bailor was granted recovery on the basis of
negligence rather than reliance8 The early
charitable subscription cases in Oklahoma (a
charitable institution relying on a promised gift or
donation) focus on railroads rather than the usual
charitable institutions such as churches, schools,
and hospitals. In the typical railroad case, a resi-
dent of a town promises to pay the railroad a stated
amount if the railroad comes through that town.
Although the courts label these promises as
gratuitous and enforce them through promissory
estoppel, they clearly are promises made for the
consideration of directing the railroad through that
particular town.29 We found no church, school, or
hospital case resolved on or even discussing
detrimental reliance.
Beyond these four traditional classes of cases,
Oklahoma courts treat gift promises in a variety of
ways. Generally, opinions show an avoidance of
the doctrine whenever possible. The court may find
consideration for the promisor's promise despite the
absence of express consideration in the offer.
Langdon v. Saga Corp.a0 is an example of the
court's straining to find consideration for what
should have been a gratuitous promise. Langdon
was employed by Saga's predecessor under an oral
contract which provided for periodic compensation
but which had no fixed term. When Saga merged
with the predecessor company, Langdon continued
to work. Saga issued its personnel manual which
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"Executory gift promises and pre-offer statements may be
enforceable under detrimental reliance. . .
described benefits calculated to induce employees
to increase production and to remain with the com-
pany. When Saga terminated Langdon without giv-
ing him the benefits described in the manual,
Langdon sued for breach of contract. Saga respond-
ed that no contract existed. The court came
dangerously close to detrimental reliance:
Where an employee at will forgoes options to
refuse future performance in reliance or in par-
tial reliance on articulated personnel policies of
the employer, the employer is bound by those
policies insofar as they have accrued to an
employee for performance rendered while they
were in effect and have not been excluded or
modified by another valid contractual arrange-
ment.31
Rather than use this bold new reasoning, the deci-
sion instead rested on a strained finding of con-
sideration:
We thus conceive personnel policies extending
benefits as unilateral offers which are accepted
by continued performance.
Thus Saga's promise to pay benefits was not a gift
promise but was made for a price-the employee s
continued performance.
Once a court makes the determination that a
promise was not a gift promise but was made for
consideration, a discussion of detrimental reliance
is unnecessary. But when the court finds that the
promise was in fact a gift promise, the court should
then be faced with the question of detrimental
reliance.
This precise fact situation faced the court in Na-
tional Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Kalkhurst.33
Kalkhurst was employed by Western on a month-
to-month contract. One day Kalkhurst was notified
that he was being retired and that he would receive
$200 a month for life. He was paid $200 a month
for 6 months, $100 a month for the next 6 months,
and nothing thereafter. He then sued for breach of
contract. The court found the company's promise
to be a gift. (a promise without consideration) and
therefore an absence of contract formation. The
court did not discuss whether the gift promise
should be enforceable through detrimental reliance.
Even though Kalkhurst would have had trouble
proving the elements for detrimental reliance, had
the court discussed detrimental reliance, even
though holding it inapplicable to the facts of that
case, it would have signaled an acceptance of the
doctrine in gift promise cases.34
Langdon and Kalkhurst show the preference of
Oklahoma courts to remain on familiar ground by
dealing solely with consideration rather than
reliance in gratuitous promise type cases. With a
wider recognition of the value of detrimental
reliance in such situations, courts could achieve the
same results by a less strained method or achieve
different results, thus avoiding the injustice which
sometimes accompanies a finding of no contract.
Another device used by Oklahoma courts when
confronted with facts adaptable to detrimental
reliance on a promise, is to apply equitable estoppel
instead. McDowell v. Cagle35 involved a lessor's
assurance that lessee could harvest his alfalfa seed
crop after the expiration of the lease in order to
realize more profit for both parties. Relying on the
lessor's assurance, the lessee had left his crop
Vol. 52-No. 8412
unharvested, and the lessor attempted to harvest it
himself and retain all the profits.
Rather than treat the case as an oral contract
breached by the lessor or a gift promise enforceable
under promissory estoppel, the supreme court used
the traditional elements of equitable estoppel to
preclude the lessor from denying his representation
and conduct. In addition to the difference in
elements between equitable and promissory estop-
pel, detrimental reliance on a promise has a much
broader scope in application. "The major distinc-
tion between equitable and promissory estoppel is
that equitable estoppel is available only as a
defense, while promissory estoppel can be used as a
cause of action for damages. "36
Even though Oklahoma courts have not ruled on
whether promissory estoppel can be a cause of ac-
tion, confusion between equitable and promissory
estoppel could limit the doctrine of detrimental
reliance to defensive applications.
THE POWER TO REVOKE AN OFFER
PRIOR TO ACCEPTANCE
When an offeror creates the power in the offeree
to enter into a contractual relationship (that is, an
offer is made), the offeror retains the power to
revoke the offer prior to acceptance. If the offer
was for a unilateral contract, that is the offeror's
promise was made to get the offeree to perform (a
promise for a performance), then the offeror could
revoke his or her offer at any time prior to full per-
formance. A classical textbook illustration is "The
Brooklyn Bridge Hypothetical:"
Suppose A says to B, "I will give you $100 if
you walk across the Brooklyn Bridge" . . . . B
starts to walk across the Brooklyn Bridge and
has gone about one-half of the way across. At
that moment A overtakes B and says to him, "I
withdraw my offer." Has B then any rights
against A? Again, let us suppose that after A
has said, "I withdraw my offer," B continues to
walk across the Brooklyn Bridge and completes
the act of crossing. Under these circumstances,
has B any rights against A? ....
What A wanted from B, what A asked for,
was the act of walking across the bridge. Until
that was done, B had not given to A what A
had requested. The acceptance of B of A's offer
could be nothing but the act of B's part of
crossing the bridge. It is elementary that an of-
feror may withdraw his offer until it has been
accepted. It follows logically that A is perfectly
within his rights in withdrawing his offer
before B has accepted it by walking across the
bridge-the act contemplated by the offeror
and the offeree as the acceptance of the offer.37
The Restatement of Contracts §45 (1932) sug-
gested that the offeree's reliance (beginning perfor-
mance) should negate the offeror's power to revoke
and thus permit the offeree the opportunity to com-
plete performance and accept the offer.3 8 The
language of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
§45 is even more explicit:
(1) Where an offer invites an offeree to ac-
cept by rendering a performance and does not
invite a promissory acceptance, an option con-
tract is created when the offeree tenders or
begins the invited performance or tenders a
beginning of it.
(2) The offeror's duty of performance under
any option contract so created is conditional
on completion or tender of the invited perform-
ance in accordance with the terms of the
offer.39
The Oklahoma Supreme Court cites with ap-
proval the Restatement (First) §45. The case,
Petroleum Research Corp. v. Barnsdall Refining
Corp., involves a bilateral contract and the discus-
sion of unilateral contract provides the court with
an alternative ground for affirming the decision.4 0
The Oklahoma courts have yet to cite the Restate-
ment (Second) §45. Since the contract was bilateral,
Petroleum Research should not have discussed
Restatement (First) §45. The fact that the court did
discuss reliance upon a promise to enter into a
unilateral contract, indicates the court's qualified
recognition of the doctrine in this area.
Very few offers are unilateral-a promise in-
viting a performance as acceptance. Most are
bilateral-a promise inviting a promise as accept-
ance. The Restatements §45 only apply to a
unilateral offer and by their language are inap-
plicable to a bilateral offer. While §90 was designed
for the promise without consideration (the gift
promise), several cases have extended its applica-
tion to negate the offeror's power to revoke in a
bilateral offer situation. Drennan v. Star Paving
Co., a California subcontractor case, was the land-
mark case. 4 1
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Star Paving submitted its bid for the paving sub-
contract to Drennan, a general contractor, who
was preparing its own bid for the school construc-
tion contract. Drennan used Star's bid in com-
puting its bid and subsequently Drennan was
awarded the general contract. Before Drennan
could accept Star's offer for the paving subcontract,
Star revoked its offer.
The California Supreme Court used detrimental
reliance to negate the subcontractor's power to
revoke its offer. First, analogizing to the Restate-
ment (First) §45, the court held that the general con-
tractor's using the sub's bid in preparation of its
own bid, an act of detrimental reliance, could
create an option promise not to revoke the bilateral
offer (promise/promise).
But, in order for the implied promise not to
revoke to be binding on the offeror, there must be
consideration for this option promise. Again, the
court used the general contractor's reliance on the
sub's bid with Restatement (First) §90 to bind the
promisor-this time by using the more familiar
device of detrimental reliance in lieu of considera-
tion. The effect of the Drennan reasoning was to
create an option contract when an act of reliance on
a bilateral offer occurs which meets the re-
quirements of §90.42
Not long after the monumental Drennan deci-
sion, the American Law Institute legitimized the
decision by its promulgation of Restatement (Sec-
ond) §87(2):
An offer which the offeror should
does induce such action or forbearance is bind-
ing as an option contract to the extent
necessary to avoid injustice.4 3
Nationally courts have adopted the Drennan ap-
proach to detrimental reliance.44 Even though
Oklahoma has not ruled on this application,4 5 the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently ruled
favorably in a Texas case, Montgomery Industries
International, Inc. v. Thomas Construction Co., a
case with facts quite similar to Drennan."* In this
manner the trend continues toward expansion of
detrimental reliance on a promise.
THE ENFORCEMENT OF STATEMENTS
MADE DURING PRELIMINARY NEGOTIATIONS
An offer can be defined as the offeror's creation
of power in the offeree which permits the offeree by
his or her voluntary act to create the new relation-
ship called a contract.4 7 The components of an offer
are the offeror's promise and the consideration for
the offeror's promise. To distinguish an offer from
preliminary negotiations, the offeror's promise may
in turn be defined as an unequivocal assurance that
something will or will not be done." Must the
promise for promissory estoppel (or detrimental
reliance on a promise) be the equivalent of a prom-
ise for offer? Several courts have held no. In Hoff-
man v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., a chain store
representative assured a prospective franchise
holder that he should sell his bakery, move, buy a
small grocery store and then sell it in order to
prepare for the forthcoming franchise. Despite the
absence of essential terms necessary to form an of-
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fer promise, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held
that Hoffman could recover on his reliance of the
assurances by the Red Owl representative. The
language in Hoffman is important. It suggests the
emergence of a new cause of action; one neither
contract nor tort. The label used in Hoffman was
an "action grounded on promissory estoppel."so
Since the facts in Hoffman are pre-offer and thus
pre-contract formation, no cause of action for
breach of contract could be maintained without
substantial twisting and bending of established doc-
trine. Hoffman is not unique. The Texas Supreme
Court in Wheeler v. White, a case decided almost
simultaneously with Hoffman, drew similar conclu-
sions.51
Whether this "new cause of action" will be readi-
ly accepted by other courts is yet to be seen. The
Oklahoma case closest to recognizing an action for
pre-offer based on promissory estoppel, was decid-
ed ten years before Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores and
Wheeler v. White. In Buster v. Phillips Petroleum
Co. 52 a number of landowners brought suit to en-
join Phillips, their oil and gas lessee, from discon-
necting their gas operated irrigation wells from the
company's gas lines. The lessors had drilled the ir-
rigation wells on the assurance by Phillips that
Phillips would contract with them for the use of gas
if they found water for their pumps.
After the wells were drilled and the pumps con-
nected to the company's gas lines, Phillips and the
lessors did not contract and ultimately Phillips
notified the lessors that their lines would be discon-
nected. The Federal District Court for the Western
District of Oklahoma granted the lessors' injunction
on the basis of promissory estoppel.1 The Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part and
reversed in part.54 While the Tenth Circuit's opin-
ion is laced with reliance language, the holding is
based on an oral contract and not on detrimental
reliance in the pre-offer state. Thus whether
Oklahoma will extend detrimental reliance to the
pre-offer stage is yet to be decided.
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
A contract to answer for the duty of another, a
contract not to be performed within a year from the
date of contract formation, a contract for the sale
of an interest in land or for a real estate lease for a
period longer than one year, and a contract for the
sale of goods $500 or mqre require a writing to be
enforceable. 5 Oral contracts for the sale of real
estate have long been enforced through the doctrine
of part performance. The acts of part performance
required to take the oral contract out of the Statute
of Frauds vary widely among states, ranging from a
mere showing that the purchase price has been par-
tially tendered, to combinations of complete tender
of the purchase price, permanent and valuable im-
provements made in reliance on the oral contract,
and possession of the. land exclusive, adverse, and
hostile to that of the vendor. 56 Implicit in the doc-
trine of part performance is the concept of
detrimental reliance.
Although an oral contract not to be performed
within a year is unenforceable under the Statute of
Frauds, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has ap-
plied estoppel to circumvent the statute. In Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Buster, the court rejected
Phillips's Statute of Fraud contention and restrained
Phillips from disconnecting the lessors gas operated
irrigation well pumps from Phillips's gas lines."
Oklahoma courts have held that an oral agree-
ment to sell real estate is removed from the opera-
tion of the Statute of Frauds by possession in good
faith along with part payment of the purchase
price, or possession in good faith along with
valuable and lasting improvements made to the
land."8 The same rule applies to an oral agreement
for the lease of land.5 9
Even if the doctrine of part performance is inap-
plicable, Oklahoma courts have enforced oral
agreements. concerning real estate if the offeror
promises to make a writing as a memorial to the
oral contract. Lacy v. Wozencraft is illustrative.s0
After the three year written lease had expired, Lacy
continued to occupy the premises for one year and
during that time the lessor and lessee orally con-
tracted for another three year term and for the con-
tract to be reduced to writing at the convenience of
the lessor. The improvements made by the lessee
(improvements that suited lessee's particular
business) did not entitle the lessee to claim the part
performance doctrine due to the lack of permanent
value of the improvements. The lessee claimed that
the oral lease was enforceable because he had
detrimentally relied on the lessor's promise to
reduce the oral lease to writing.
According to defendant's evidence in the in-
stant case, plaintiff [lessor] promised to execute
to defendant [lessee] a valid three year lease
plaintiff intended that the promise be acted
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"The power to revoke an offer prior to acceptance may
be negated through detrimental reliance... "
upon; the promise was acted upon by defend-
ant without protest or warning from the plain-
tiff, resulting in material detriment to defend-
ant. These facts bring the case well within the
rule stated above.
Our statute provides that one may be estop-
ped to deny a contract affecting real estate
where he has received benefits therefrom, sec.
9668, O.S. 1931, 16 Okl. St. Ann. §11, but the
statutes do not purport to define all classes of
estoppel. Circumstances like those in the in-
stant case are always considered sufficient to
work estoppel."1
The promise forming the keystone in Lacy was
the lessor's promise to reduce the oral contract to
writing. In effect the lessor promised to supply the
writing necessary to take the contract out of the
Statute of Frauds, did not supply the writing, and
then wanted to claim that the contract was unen-
forceable due to the Statute of Frauds. This differs
from the situation where the lessor does not pro-
mise to reduce the oral contract to writing. In those
cases, the promise to lease must be the promise
upon which the lessee relies.62
Under the Uniform Commercial Code an oral
contract for the sale of goods for the price of $500
or more must be in writing to be enforceable.6 3 As
an exception to the writing requirement, the Code
provides a limited "partial performance" doctrine
"with respect to goods for which payment has been
made and accepted or which have been received
and accepted."64 In addition to the exceptions pro-
vided in the Code, the issue has often been raised
whether detrimental reliance can be used to take the
case out of the Statute of Frauds. Courts are split.' 5
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts §139 sup-
ports the use of reliance as a means of avoiding the
Statute of Frauds:
(1) A promise which the promisor should
reasonably expect to induce action or
forbearance on the part of the promisee or a
third person and which does induce the action
or forbearance is enforceable notwithstanding
the Statute of Frauds if injustice can be avoided
only by enforcement of the promise. The
remedy granted for breach is to be limited as
justice requires."
The Oklahoma Supreme Court was presented
the issue of whether detrimental reliance will take
an oral contract for the sale of goods for $500 or
more out of the Statute of Frauds in Darrow v.
Spencer.67 The court held that the use of the doc-
trine of promissory estoppel would be inap-
propriate since under the facts the "promissor" was
not sure that the parties had reached an agreement.
While Darrow cannot be viewed as a hardy en-
dorsement of the doctrine, the court did not reject
the use of the doctrine if the appropriate case does
arise.
ORAL MODIFICATION OF A
WRITTEN CONTRACT
As a general rule, a contract may be modified by
either a written or oral contract and whether the
modification needs to be in writing is determined
on whether the contract as modified comes within
the Statute of Frauds. If the contract as modified
comes within the Statute of Frauds, it must be in
writing to be enforceable. If the contract as
modified is not within the Statute of Frauds, even
though the original contract was, the oral modifica-
tion is enforceable.68
Oklahoma, by statute, limits the methods by
which a written contract can be modified:
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A contract in writing may be altered by a
contract in writing, or by an executed oral
agreement, and not otherwise. 9
But Oklahoma courts have applied detrimental
reliance to move Oklahoma law closer to the
general rule. In Knittel v. Security State Bank,"
the Bank orally promised Knittel that he could
delay in making the next payment on his prom-
issory note. When Knittel did delay, the Bank con-
sidered the note in default and the payments ac-
celerated. The Bank then proceeded to apply
money in Knittel's bank account to his note and
then sued for the balance of the note.
Under the statute, the Bank's oral modification of
the installment date was only executory and thus
unenforceable. The Oklahoma Supreme Court,
however, refused to apply the statute. The Bank
was estopped from requiring literal compliance
with the statute since the Bank promised Knittel
that it would not consider the late payment a
default and Knittel relied on this promise to his
detriment. 7 1
CONCLUSION
Detrimental reliance on a promise is reshaping
the law of contracts. Executory gift promises and
pre-offer statements may be enforceable. The
power to revoke an offer prior to acceptance may
be negated. Oral contracts may be taken out of the
Statute of Frauds and written contracts may be
modified orally although a statute indicates other-
wise. The landmark cases for detrimental reliance
have appeared in the major commercial states and
have been followed, albeit slowly, by other states.
In Oklahoma, promissory estoppel, and its
forerunner equitable estoppel, have long been
recognized. The full implementation of detrimental
reliance in Oklahoma, however, has been uneven.
Detrimental reliance removes an oral modification
of a written contract from the Oklahoma statute
which prevents such modifications. Detrimental
reliance takes certain cases out of the Statute of
Frauds. But the Oklahoma courts have not extend-
ed detrimental reliance to either the pre-offer prom-
ise or the power to revoke.
In the area of gift promises, application of
reliance has been spotty and often the courts cir-
cumvent reliance by striving to find consideration
for the promise. The doctrine, itself, has never been
rejected by the Oklahoma courts. At worst, the
court has found the doctrine inapplicable to the set
of facts in litigation.
From the appellate opinions, it appears that
detrimental reliance has not been raised in cases
where it might have been. Even in those cases
where it has been raised, a clear, precise, presenta-
tion of the many facets of the doctrine has been
lacking. With current law school casebooks stress-
ing detrimental reliance, pressure will mount to
break from the current tendency to decide cases on
established contract law and instead push for the
frontiers.
1. Estoppels are sometimes said to be of three kinds:
(1) by deed; (2) by matter of record; (3) by matter in pais
(conduct). Estoppel by deed and by matter of record are
also called legal estoppels, as distinguished from estop-
pel by matter in pais, known as equitable estoppel.
"Black's Law Dictionary" (rev. 4th ed. 1968). Estoppel
by matter of record is when any matter adjudicated in a
court of record is forever precluded by the party from
afterwards contesting the same fact in any subsequent
suit with his or her adversary. An example of estoppel
by deed is when the party executing a bond is precluded
from afterwards denying, in any action brought on that
instrument, the facts recited in that bond. B. Shipman,
"Handbook of Common-Law Pleading" 356 (3d ed.
1923).
"Equitable estoppel in the modem sense arises from
the conduct of a party, using that word in its broadest
meaning as including his spoken or written words, his.
positive acts, and his silence or negative omission to do
anything." 3 J. Pomeroy, "A Treatise on Equity
Jurisprudence" 180 (5th ed. 1941). D. Dobbs, "Hand-
book on the Law of Remedies" 42 (1973), poses the
following illustration of equitable estoppel:
X begins building a garage while N, a neighbor,
stands by watching. N makes no objection, but
when X completes the job, N says politely, "I think
you have built the garage on my land." He then
orders a survey and finds that it is indeed so. N then
sues X in equity to force removal of the offending.
structure . . .. [N may be] estopped from asserting
the true location of the lot line, because his conduct
(including silence here) misled X, and that if N is
allowed to assert the truth now, this will combine
with his earlier inconsistent conduct to cause harm
to X.
For Oklahoma cases using equitable estoppel, see
Apex Siding & Roofing Co. v. First Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 301 P.2d 352 (Okla. 1956) (statements of fact);
Bowen v. Freeark, 370 P.2d 546 (Okla. 1962) (silence);
Johnson v. State, 186 Okla. 80, 96 P.24 313 (1939) (con-
duct); Heckman v. Davis, 56 Okla. 483, 155 P. 1170
(1916) (silence).
2. These elements date back to Bragdon v. McShea,
26 Okla. 35, 39, 107 P. 916, 918 (1910). Bragdon is then
cited by Flesner v. Cooper, 62 Okla. 263, 267, 162 P.
1112, 1116 (1917), and Flesner in turn is cited by Lacy v.
Wozencraft, 188 Okla. 19, 20, 105 P.2d 781, 783 (1940),
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the estoppel case most often cited in Oklahoma opin-
ions.
3. Lacy v. Wozencraft, 188 Okla. 19, 20, 105 P.2d
781, 783 (1940).
4. The term first appeared in 1 S. Williston, "The
Law of Contracts" §139 (1st ed. 1920), although the doc-
trine was applied in many states under other names. B.
Boyer, "Promissory Estoppel: Requirements and Limita-
tions of the Doctrine," 98 U. Pa. L. Rev. 459, 459 (1950).
For a complete discussion of reliance on a promise,
see 1A A. Corbin, "Contracts" §§193-209 (1963); Boyer,
"Promissory Estoppel: Principle from Precedents" (pts.
1-2), 50 Mich. L. Rev. 639, 873 (1952); Fuller & Perdue,
"The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages" (pts. 1-2),
46 Yale L:J. 52, 373 (1963); Henderson, "Promissory
Estoppel and Traditional Contract Doctrine," 78 Yale
L.J. 343 (1969).
5. Lacy v. Wozencraft, 188 Okla. 19, 20, 105 P.2d
781, 783 (1940).
6. The distinction between whether a fact or a prom-
ise is relied upon is not always observed by the courts.
Equitable estoppel precedents are used for promissory
estoppel cases with little or no discussion of the dif-
ferences between the two doctrines. Lacy v. Wozen-
craft, 188 Okla. 19, 20, 105 P.2d 781, 783 (1940);
Johnson v. State, 186 Okla. 80, 81, 96 P.2d 313, 315(1939); Exchange Nat'i Bank v. Essley, 173 Okla. 2, 4, 46
P.2d 462, 464 (1935).
7. Ricketts v. Scothorn, 57 Neb. 51, 77 N.W. 365
(1898).
8. Greiner v. Greiner, 131 Kan. 760, 293 P. 759
(1930); Seavey v. Drake, 62 N.H. 393 (1882); Freeman
v. Freeman, 43 N.Y. 34 (1870).
9. Tomko v. Sharp, 87 N.J.L. 385, 94 A. 793 (1915);
Siegel v. Spear & Co., 234 N.Y. 479, 138 N.E. 414
(1923). See generally Note, "The Extent of a Gratuitous
Bailee's Liability in Contract," 23 Colum. L. Rev. 573(1923).
10. Miller v. Western College, 177 Ill. 280, 52 N.E.
432 (1898); Allegheny College v. National Chatauqua
County Bank, 246 N.Y. 369, 159 N.E. 173 (1927) (dic-
tum); Annot., 151 A.L.R. 1238 (1944). In Allegheny
College, the leading charitable subscription case, the
court found consideration for the promisor's promise to
pay $5,000 to the College. Justice Cardozo, in dictum,
recognized the doctrine of promissory estoppel in
charitable subscription cases.
11. Lacy v. Wozencraft, 188 Okla. 19, 20, 105 P.2d
781, 783 (1940).
12. See, e.g., Simpson Centenary College v. Tuttle,
71 Iowa 596, 33 N.W. 74 (1887); Ricketts v. Scothorn,
57 Neb. 51, 77 N.W. 365 (1898); Cameron v. Townsend,
286 Pa. 393, 133 A. 632 (1926).
13. The Restatement of Contracts §90 (1932) states:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably
expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite
and substantial character on the part of the prom-
isee and which does induce such action or
forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided
only by enforcement of the promise.
14. For a discussion of substantial act of reliance, see
1A A. Corbin, "Contracts" §200, at 215-17 (1963).
15. Restatement (Second) of Contracts §90 (1980).
The principal change from the original Restatement
is the recognition of the possibility of partial en-
forcement . . . . Partly because of that change, the
requirement that the action or forbearance have "a
definite and substantial character" is deleted; and
provision is added for .reliance by beneficiaries.
Id. at 220 (Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-7 (1973)).
16. See, e.g., Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co., 322 S.W.2d 163
(Mo. Ct. App. 1959); East Providence Credit Union v.
Geremia, 103 R.I. 597, 239 A.2d 725 (1968).
The phrase "promissory estoppel" is objectionable.
1A A. Corbin, "Contracts" §204 (1963).
17. In Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist., 70 Cal.
2d 240, 449 P.2d 462, 74 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1969), an
employee negotiated with the employer's agent for a-
new union contract. The employer promised to pay an-
nual merit increases for the employee's promise to work.
After the employee worked under the contract, the
employer refused to grant merit raises claiming that the
agent was not authorized to promise such increases. The
court refused to apply detrimental reliance to enforce
the employer's agent's promise since the employer's pro-
mise to pay the merit increases was bargained-for. Ac-
cord, James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., 64 F.2d 344 (2d
Cir. 1933); Strahm v. Board of Trustees of the
Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, Tulsa Lodge
946, 203 Okla. 635, 225 P.2d 159 (1950).
18. Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co., 322 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1959).
19. Miller v. Lawlor, 245 Iowa 1144, 66 N.W.2d 267
(1954).
20. Cedar State Bank v. Olson, 116 Kan. 320, 226 P.
995 (1924). See generally 1A A. Corbin, "Contracts"
§197 (1963).
21. Fried v. Fisher, 328 Pa. 497, 196 A. 39 (1938).
22. 1. Calamari & J. Perillo, "The Law of Contracts"
180 (1970).
23. Okla. Stat. tit. 15, §107 (1971). For cases applying
section 107, see Old Am. Life. Ins. Co. v. Biggers, 172
F.2d 495 (10th Cir. 1949); Kaiser v. Fadem, 280 P.2d 728
(Okla. 1955); Dobry v. Dobry Flour Mills, 270 P.2d 317
(Okla. 1954).
24. Okla. Stat. tit. 15, §114 (1971).
25. Okla. Stat. tit. 15, §115 (1971). For cases applying
sections 114 and 115, see Stillwater Industrial Founda-
tion, Inc. v. State ex rel. Bd. of Regents of Okla. A.&M.
Colleges, 541 P.2d 173 (Okla. 1975); Earth Prods. Co. v.
Oklahoma City, 441 P.2d 399 (Okla. 1968).
26. Cordrey v. Cordrey, 579 P.2d 209 (Okla. Ct.
App. 1978) (no discussion of reliance).
27. Reid v. Reid, 115 Okla. 58, 241 P. 797 (1925).
28. Kay County Free Fair Ass'n v. Martin, 190 Okla.
225, 122 P.2d 393 (1942). In Kay the court granted
recovery for a valuable tablecloth, left by the plaintiff
for exhibition, on the basis of negligence concerning the
gratuitous bailment. Since no promise had been given
concerning the bailed object, promissory estoppel was
inapplicable to the resolution of the case.
29. Ward v. Missouri, K.&O. Ry., 59 Okla. 31, 157
P. 775 (1916); Cobb v. Wm. Kenefick Co., 23 Okla.
440, 100 P. 545 (1909); Guthrie & W. Ry. v. Rhodes, 19
Okla. 21, 91 P. 1119 (1907).
The inducement of building a street was also found
subject to promissory estoppel as a gratuitous promise.
Nelson v. Longmire, 169 Okla. 80, 36 P.2d 12 (1934).
Whether the construction is of a railroad or a street, the
building should have been the consideration for the
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promise to pay, thus creating an offer for a unilateral
contract which can be accepted by perfor-
mance-building. See Courtney v. First Nat'i Bank, 569
P.2d 458 (Okla. 1977) (incomplete inter vivos gift to
charitable foundation).
30. 569 P.2d 524 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976).
31. Id. at 527.
32. Id. at 528; accord, Dangott v. ASG Industries,
Inc., 558 P.2d 379 (Okla. 1976) (severance pay).
33. 418 P.2d 661 (Okla. 19.66).
34. Although the subject matter-retirement
benefits-is the same in Kalkliurst as that in Feinberg v.
Pfeiffer Co., 322 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959), a
case enforcing the promise to pay, the reliance in
Feinberg was substantially different than that in
Kalkhurst. Feinberg had a choice of when or whether to
retire; Kalkhurst had no choice. (Care must be taken in
comparing Feinberg with Kalkhurst since Feinberg
predated the Restatement (Second) of Contracts §90 and
has the element of "substantial act of reliance," an ele-
ment deleted in the Restatement (Second).)
Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Essley, 173 Okla. 2, 46 P.2d
462 (1935) (no promise upon which to base estoppel).
In Johnson v. State, 186 Okla. 80, 96 P.2d 313
(1939), a bastardy action, the defendant's 3 year statute
of limitations defense was precluded (estopped) by his
promise to support. While his promise was a gift prom-
ise, the action was not for breach of contract and the
case lends no support to the use of reliance for the en-
forcement of gift promises as contracts. For another
statute of limitations case, see Empire Gas & Fuel Co. v.
Lindersmith, 131 Okla. 183, 268 P. 218 (1928)
(negligence action).
35. 205 Okla. 554, 240 P.2d 783 (1951) (lessor sued to
enjoin lessee from interfering with the harvest by
lessor). See also, Fipps v. Stidham, 174 Okla. 473, 50
P.2d 680 (1935).
36. Tiffany, Inc. v. W.M.K. Transit Mix, Inc., 16
Ariz. App. 415, 493 P.2d 1220, 1224 (1972).
37. Wormser, "The True Conception of Unilateral
Contracts," 26 Yale L.J. 136-37 (1916).
38. Restatement of Contracts §45 (1932) entitled,
"Revocation of Offer for Unilateral Contract; Effect of
Part Performance or Tender," states:
If an offer for a unilateral contract is made, and
part of the consideration requested in the offer is
given or tendered by the offeree in response
thereto, the offeror is bound by a contract, the duty
of immediate performance of which is conditional
on the full consideration being given or tendered
within the time stated in the offer, or, if no time is
stated therein, within a reasonable time.
39. Restatement (Second) of Contracts §45 (1980).
40. 188 Okla. 62, 105 P.2d 1047 (1940).
41. 51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958).
42. Drennan has received extensive discussion. See,
e.g., "Promissory Estoppel in California:
Subcontractor's Bid Irrevocable as Result of
Contractor's Reliance," 47 Calif. L. Rev. 405 (1959);
"Subcontractor's Offer for Bilateral Contract Held Ir-
revocable Because of Contractor's Foreseeable
Reliance," 59 Colum. L. Rev. 355 (1959); "Contracts:
Promissory Estoppel Applied to a Commercial Transac-
tion in California," 10 Hastings L.J. 435 (1959); "Con-
tractors: Promissory Estoppel," 43 Marq. L. Rev. 384
(1960); "Promissory Estoppel-Reliance on Mistaken
Bid of Subcontractor," 26 Mo. L. Rev. 356 (1961); "Ap-
plication of the Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel to
Commercial Transactions," 32 S. Calif. L. Rev. 413
(1959); "Extension of the Doctrine of Promissory Estop-
pel into Bargained-for Transactions," 20 Sw. L.J. 656
(1966); "The 'Firm Offer' Problem in Construction Bids
and the Need for Promissory Estoppel," 10 Wm. &
Mary L. Rev. 212 (1968).
43. Restatement (Second) of Contracts §87(2) (1980)
(numbered 89B (2) durihg the tentative draft stage).
44. Reynolds v. Texarkana Constr. Co., 237 Ark.
583, 374 S.W. 2d 818 (1964); C&K Eng'r v. Amber Steel
Co., 23 Cal. 3d 1, 587 P. 2d 1136, 151 Cal. Rptr. 323
(1978); Harry Harris, Inc. v. Quality Constr., 593 S.W.
2d 872 (Ky. 1979); E.A. Coronis v. M. Gordon Constr.
Co., 90 N.J. Super. 69, 216 A.2d 246 (1966); North-
western Eng'r Co. v. Ellerman, 69 S.D. 397, 10 N.W.2d
879 (1943); Ferrer v. Taft Structurals, Inc., 587 P.2d 177
(Wash. Ct. App. 1978).
Debron Corp. v. National Homes Constr. Corp.,
493 F.2d 352 (8th Cir. 1974), another reluctant subcon-
tractor case, appears to rely on Drennan but in fact
distorts the doctrine of detrimental reliance. Before trial,
Debron voluntarily dismissed its count for breach of
contract and submitted its proof solely on the theory of
promissory estoppel. Drennan is a breach of contract ac-
tion with reliance merely providing the implied option
contract so Drennan could accept Star's offer even
though Star attempted to revoke. In Debron, the sub-
contractor made the offer and the prime contractor ac-
cepted it before the subcontractor attempted to revoke.
The facts present a breach of contract action without
regard to detrimental reliance. Unfortunately, the deci-
sion was based on promissory estoppel.
45. The closest that Oklahoma has come to detrimen-
tal reliance to imply an option contract was in Western
Contracting Corp. v. Sooner Constr. Co., 256 F. Supp.
163 (W.D. Okla. 1966). The exact question was never
raised because Western and Sooner went through a
series of rejection counteroffers rather than for Sooner
attempting to accept Western's offer after Western at-
tempts to revoke.
46. 620 F.2d 91 (5th Cir. 1980). The court in Mont-
gomery Industries quotes the Restatement (First) §90 but
does not mention either the Restatement (Second) §90 or
§87(2) (formerly 89B(2)), although both were in ten-
tative draft form dating back to 1965.
47. Corbin, "Offer and Acceptance, and Some of the
Resulting Legal Relations," 26 Yale L.J. 169, 181-82
(1917). The Restatement (Second) of Contracts §24
(1980) defines offer as:
the manifestation of willingness to enter into a
bargain, so made as to justify another person in
understanding that his assent to that bargain is in-
vited and will conclude it.
48. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts §2(1)
(1980) defines a promise as:
a manifestation of intention to act or refrain from
acting in a specified way, so made as to justify a
promisee in understanding that a commitment has
been made.
49. 26 Wis. 2d 683, 133 N.W.2d 267 (1965). For a
discussion of Hoffman, see "Contracts-Expanded Ap-
plication of Promissory Estoppel in Restatement of Con-
tracts Section 90," 65 Mich. L. Rev. 351 (1966).
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50. Id. at , 133 N.W.2d at 275.
51. 398 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. 1965).
52. 133 F. Supp. 594 (W.D. Okla. 1955).
53. Id. at 601-02. The court's opinion is vague on the
exact ground for the holding.
54. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Buster, 241 F.2d 178
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 816 (1957).
55. Okla. Stat. tit. 15, §136, 12A, §2-201(1) (1971).
56. 2 A. Corbin, "Contracts" §§433-34 (1950).
57. 241 F.2d 178, 184 (10th Cir. 1957). The court did
not give blanket approval to estopping the assertion the
Statute of Frauds. The court emphasized that "[these
were not actions for the enforcement of the oral
agreements. They were actions to restrain wrongful
discontinuance of the furnishing of gas pursuant to the
terms of the agreements." This appears to be a distinc-
tion without a difference.
58. Lacy v. Wozencraft, 188 Okla. 19, 105 P.2d 781
(1940); Reid v. Reid, 115 Okla. 58, 241 P. 797 (1925);
Johnston v. Baldock, 83 Okla. 285, 201 P. 654 (1921);
Boese v. Childress, 83 Okla. 60, 200 P. 997 (1921).
59. Lacy v. Wozencraft, 188 Okla. 19, 105 P.2d 781
(1940).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 20, 105 P.2d at 783.
62. Funk v. Anderson-Rooney Operating Co., 423
P.2d 465 (Okla. 1966); Cauthron v. Goodwin, 287 P.2d
893 (Okla. 1955).
63. U.C.C. §2-201(1), enacted as Okla. Stat. tit. 12A,
§2-201(1) (1971). The writing requirement can be
satisfied by a subsection (1) writing or a subsection (2)
writing-the written confirmation between merchants.
64. U.C.C. §2-201(3) (c). The Code provides two ad-
ditional exceptions: §2-201(3) (a) (specially manufac-
tured goods) and §2-201(3) (b) (admissions in court).
65. Compare Warder & Lee Elevator, Inc. v. Britten,
274 N.W.2d 339 (Iowa 1979), and Glasscock v. Wilson
Constructors, Inc., 627 F.2d 1065 (10th Cir. 1980), with
Ivey's Plumbing & Elec. Co. v. Petrochem Maintenance,
Inc., 463 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Miss. 1978).
66. Restatement (Second) of Contracts §139 (1980).
67. 581 P.2d 1309 (Okla. 1978). In Fox v. Overton,
534 P.2d 679 (Okla. 1975), the sellers contended that the
buyer had breached an oral contract to buy corporate
stock. This contract was required to be in writing to be
enforceable. Okla. Stat. tit. 12A, §8-319 (1971). Since
the sellers did not plead estoppel at trial, estoppel could
not be raised on appeal.
68. This discussion assumes that the pre-existing duty
problem has been resolved so the modification is a con-
tract or the modification is enforceable without being a
contract. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§222,
223 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1968); U.C.C. §2-209(3).
69. Okla. Stat, Ann. tit. 15, §237 (1971).
70. 593 P.2d 92 (Okla. 1979).
71. Accord, Bowen v. Freeark, 370 P.2d 546 (Okla.
1962); Walker Valley Oil & Gas Co. v. Parks & Palmer,
128 Okla. 286, 262 P. 672 (1928). In Walker Valley, the
actions by the drilling Company's agent cause the other
party's performance to become impossible. The drilling
company, when attempting to enforce a payment provi-
sion by the other party, was estopped from asserting
that the modification be in writing.
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DIRECTOR OF OKLAHOMA COUNTY
JUVENILE BUREAU NEEDED
The director is the chief administrative officer and must be at least thirty years old; have
attained the minimum educational level of a bachelor's degree from an accredited college or
university, preferably with courses in the behavioral or social sciences; eight years employ-
ment in a justice or related field; and at least two years of proven managerial/administrative
experience. Experience in fiscal and inventory control, program development and manage-
ment, personnel and salary administration, policy and procedure development and im-
plementation, Federal Grants administration and statutory regulations is preferred. Must
have ability and experience in working with private and public agencies, law enforcement,
the legislature and citizens groups. Salary is negotiable up to $30,000 annually. Applications
must be submitted no later than Friday, March 20, 1981, to the Presiding Judge of the
Juvenile Court of Oklahoma County, Room 201, County Courthouse, Oklahoma City,
73102.
Vol. 52-No. 8420
